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Abstract
We study the effect of electoral systems on openness to immigration.
According to the literature, in our model plurality systems induce a rent-
seeking policymaker to get re-election through locally provided public
goods rather than through transfers, whereas the opposite occurs un-
der proportional representation. In both systems policymakers can use
immigration to enlarge the tax base and retrieve increased rents after
compensating the decisive majority. However, this mechanism is more
effective when the increased tax base does not flow to non-voting immi-
grants through transfers. Therefore, plurality electoral systems generate
more openness to immigration. We find support for this result on a cross-
section of 34 OECD countries. In addition, we show that mass immigra-
tion might incentivize policymakers to obtain re-election throug public
goods rather than transfers also in proportional electoral systems.
Keywords: electoral systems, rent extraction, immigration.
JEL codes: D72, D78, F22, H00, H40.
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1 Introduction
A well-developed literature studies the effect of the electoral systems on the
level and the allocation of government spending. Typically, it is found that
plurality systems incentivize the use of locally provided public goods rather than
transfers, while the opposite occurs for proprotional systems (see, for example,
Persson and Tabellini, 2002; Lizzeri and Persico, 2001; Milesi-Ferretti et al.,
2002). This happens because the electoral system shapes the policymakers’
incentives in the electoral competition.
∗We thank Antonio Abatemarco, Michel Beine, Vincenzo Carrieri, Serge Coulombe, Ser-
gio Destefanis, Fausto Galli, Letizia Giorgetti, Annamaria Menichini, Vincenzo Pierro, Luigi
Senatore, Erika Uberti.
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Immigration affects both the tax base and the distribution of welfare ben-
efits, which, according to the literature, are connected to the electoral system.
Thus, it seems possible that electoral systems interact with decisions concerning
openness to immigration. However, to the best of our knowledge, the possible
existence of a transmission mechanism from electoral systems to immigration
openness has not yet been investigated.
Following Persson and Tabellini (2002), we develop a model of representative
democracy with retrospective voting. In our model a rent-seeking government
allows immigration in order to increase the tax base, then it compensates the
wage loss of the decisive constituencies and retains the remaining tax revenues
as a rent.
As we have remarked above, it is well-known that plurality electoral sys-
tems bias government spending towards locally provided public goods, while
proportional electoral systems incentivize the use of transfers.
When decisions on immigration inflows are endogenized, we reproduce the
first result, but we show that the second holds only if the share of immigrants
entitled to transfers is not too high. This happens because foreigners have no
voting rights, and transfers flowing to immigrants are useless in order to get
re-election. As a consequence, if too many immigrants are entitled to transfers,
a policymaker may obtain electoral consensus by using public goods rather than
transfers also in proportional electoral systems.
This outcome suggests that immigration puts special pressure on expenditure
for transfers, which is typical of proportional electoral systems.
When the policymaker secures the decisive constituencies’ vote through pub-
lic goods, he can retain a larger share of the tax base created by immigration.
We conclude that plurality electoral sytems produce more openness to immigra-
tion.
We test this prediction and find favorable evidence using per-capita immigra-
tion inflows in a cross-section of 34 OECD countries over the 1998-2006 period.
This result resists to standard robustness checks.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section describes the properties
of the electoral systems and the voters’utility; section 3 presents the retrospec-
tive voting model, section 4 compares equilibrium immigration with plurality
and proportional electoral systems, section 5 contains an empirical analysis and
section 6 summarizes our conclusions. The proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
2 Electoral systems
A plurality system partitions n voters into C constituencies. For simplicity, we
assume that to be re-appointed a candidate has to win in 1/2 constituencies,
and that 1/2 votes are sufficient to win in each constituency. As a consequence,
the successful candidate has to secure n/4 voters.
A proportional system can be considered as a single constituency where n/2
votes are required in order to be re-elected. Therefore a winning candidate has
to secure n/2 voters. With some abuse of notation, in what follows we are
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going to denote the majorities required to win the elections under the different
electoral systems (n/4, n/2) as the "decisive voters".
2.1 Voters
Consider a country populated by n natives and (potentially) by m immigrants.
Immigrants have no voting rights. The i− th voter’s utility is given by
ωi = w(n+m)(1− t) + g
α
i g
β
−i + f i = 1, ...n (1)
0 < β < α < 1; α+ β < 1.
where w(n +m)(1− t) is the individual net wage, and 0 < t < 1 is a flat-rate
tax.
gi denotes the per capita amount of public goods available to voter i in his
own district. Public goods in the rest of the economy (denoted by g−i) affect
the i− th voter’s utility through the externality gβ−i.
Most public goods produce positive externalities even though they are lo-
calized: they are necessary for the economy, and their use is not restricted1 .
Therefore public goods in different districts are still useful for everybody2 .
On the other hand, transfers f ≥ 0 are allocated on the basis of some indi-
vidual carachteristics (for example the number of dependent children, the age
and so on). As a consequence, the entitlement to transfers does not depend on
the voter’s constituency. Typically, once the eligibility criteria are established,
citizens are entitled regardless to their region of residence.
In short, we adopt the approach of Milesi-Ferretti et al., (2002): while many
public goods are provided on a territorial basis, transfers are universal.
For our purposes it is crucial that the policymaker can target gi precisely3 .
In this respect, Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002) point out that most public goods
are inherently local: especially before the elections, a policymaker can decide
strategically where to build a hospital, a school, a bridge and so on.
In order to have consistent results we need that the marginal utility from
gi should be neither too concave, neither linear. This is summarized in the
following assumption:
1
2
≤ θ(α+ β)gα+β−1i < 1, where θ ≡
(
β
α
)β
< 14 . (2)
1Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002) report the example of a military base, that provides defense
for the whole country but increases the employment in a single district.
2β < α means that the externality is less important than the direct use of public goods.
3The policymaker has to target public goods provision to a subset of voters within a con-
stituency. This requires either that the constituency is sufficiently large or that expenditures
can be addressed very precisely. We use "district" to denote the sub-constituency that includes
a specific voter.
4The marginal utility θ(α + β)gα+β−1i is derived in the proof of lemma 1 by imposing
Pareto efficiency: gi and g−i must give the same marginal utility. This implies g−i =
β
α
gi.
Substituting into gαi g
β
−i we get θg
α+β
i , and the marginal utility from gi is θ(α+ β)g
α+β−1
i .
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As it will be clearer in section 3, the lower bound is required because if
the marginal utility of public goods were too low (for example, close to zero)
a policymaker would always use transfers to get re-election. The upper bound
is required because if public goods and transfers gave the same marginal utility
there would be no reason to use the latter: public goods can be targeted to
decisive voters, while transfers spread in the economy5 .
Voters adopt a retrospective voting strategy: the incumbent policymaker is
going to be re-appointed only if he provides at least a reservation utility ̟.
2.2 The policymaker
In our model the goverment is made of a single policymaker. For this reason,
in what follows "government" and "policymaker" are used as synonims. Its
objective is to maximize the rent it is able to extract.
The government’s budget constraint is
tw(.)(n+m) = g + f(δn+ ρm) + r (3)
where g is the aggregate expenditure for public goods, f is a transfer granted
to a share 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 of the voters and to a share 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 of the immigrants. r
denotes the rent left to the policymaker. The rent is residual, and it is retained
after transfers and public goods are distributed. Intuitively, a rent-seeking gov-
ernment has no incentive to satisfy more than half the voters. As a consequence,
when transfers are used in order to get re-election, the policymaker identifies a
criterion able to entitle only one half voters. Therefore we set δ = 1/2, and we
can rewrite the government’s budget constraint:
tw(.)(n+m) = g + f(
n
2
+ ρm) + r. (4)
It is important to stress that it is difficult to deny transfers to legal immigrants:
once they meet the required criteria, they are entitled as well as the natives, and
ρ can be easily larger than 1/2 because usually immigrants are disadvantaged
with respect to the median native . This is the very reason why there exist
concerns over the existence of welfare magnets (see for example Kaushal, 2005).
3 The model
We consider a simple model of retrospective voting with sequential decisions à
la Persson and Tabellini (2002). The timing of the model is the following:
1) voters set a reservation utility ̟ required in order to re-appoint an in-
cumbent policymaker
2) the policymaker decides the immigration inflow allowed into the economy
3) the policymaker collects taxes and compensates the wage loss of the de-
cisive voters
5As we are going to see in section 3, assumption in eq. (2) rules out the possibility that it
could be worth to satisfy n/2 voters with f rather than n/4 voters with gi.
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4) the policymaker retains his rent by reducing spending for non-decisive
voters
5) vote is held, and the policymaker is re-elected if the decisive voters receive
at least ̟.
The model is solved backwards. In order to simplify our exposition, it is
useful to introduce the following lemmas:
Lemma 1 Under the assumption in eq. (2), in a plurality electoral system a
rent-seeking policymaker secures the decisive votes through public goods rather
than through transfers.
Proof. See the appendix.
Lemma 2 In a proportional electoral system, a rent-seeking policymaker se-
cures the decisive votes through transfers rather than through public goods only
if the share of immigrants entitled to transfers is not too high (ρ ≤ ρ∗).
Proof. See the appendix
Lemmas 1 and 2 reproduce a well-known outcome: plurality electoral sys-
tems bias expenditures towards locally provided public goods, whereas propor-
tional ones create a bias towards transfers.
In lemma 2, however, we introduce an important caveat: when the economy
is open to immigration, the entitlement of non-voting immigrants to transfers
could change the policymaker’s incentives: immigration puts pressure on trans-
fers provision without any electoral advantage. If too many immigrants are
entitled, a policymaker would be better of by using public goods rather than
transfers even in a proportional electoral system.
An interesting consequence is that if restructuring public spending is too
difficult, a policymaker might extend the voting franchise to immigrants.
3.1 Plurality system
Suppose for the moment that in stage 5 the policymaker is re-appointed.
3.1.1 Stage 4: rent appropriation
In stage 4 the policymaker secures re-election and retains his rent. To under-
stand his method, consider first a re-election by unanimity. For a rent-seeking
policymaker unanimity is useless: in order to be reappointed he can provide
1/4 voters6 with their reservation utility and retain the remaining tax base as
a rent.
In other words, he wants to reduce expenditures as much as possible, subject
to the constraint of giving the decisive voters their reservation utility.
From Lemma 1 we know that he will do so by cutting f and increasing gi.
6See the discussion in section 2.
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3.1.2 Stage 3: wage loss compensation
In the third stage the policymaker collects tax revenues and compensates the
decisive voters for the wage loss due to immigration. In the proof of lemma 1
(see the appendix) we show that compensation occurs through public goods also
in this case. Thus, in equilibrium there will be no transfers ( f = 0). We show
how the compensation is computed in stage 2, when the policymaker decides to
what extent opening the economy to immigration.
3.1.3 Stage 2: immigration
In the previous stages the government has set public goods provision in such a
way to obtain re-election and to maximize its rent for a given immigration level.
When the economy is open to immigration, voters suffer a wage loss propor-
tional to the immigration inflow:
Loss = w(.)′(1− t)∆m.
Consider now the marginal tax base (TB) increase due to immigration:
∆TB = t[w(.)′(n+m) + w(.)]∆m (5)
Since in a plurality system the policymaker compensates the decisive voters
through public goods, the individual compensation ∆gi must be such that
θ(α+ β)gα+β−1i ∆gi︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal utility from gi
= | w(.)′ | (1− t)∆m︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal loss
, 7 (6)
thus
∆gi =
| w(.)′ | (1− t)∆m
θ(α+ β)gα+β−1i
.
The policymaker compensates n/4 voters, and allows immigration until the
marginal tax base equals the marginal compensation cost, i.e.
t[w(.)′(n+m) + w(.)]∆m =
| w(.)′ | (1− t)∆m
θ(α+ β)gα+β−1i
(n
4
)
. (7)
Condition (7) defines implicitly the optimal immigration level within a plu-
rality system. Now we move to the first stage of the game.
3.1.4 Stage 1: reservation utility
In the first stage of the game voters set their reservation utility ̟. They set
the highest ̟ compatible with the policymaker’s incentives.
The incumbent policymaker is able to extract a rent r. LetR be the expected
discounted utility of remaining in office. Under a retrospective voting strategy,
7See footnote 2 and the proof of lemma 1 to see how to obtain the marginal utility θ(α+
β)gα+β−1i .
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the policymaker is going to be reappointed if he provides n/4 voters with ̟
at least. Otherwise, voters are going to appoint a new government. When a
policymaker is not concerned about re-election, he simply predates the whole
tax base, thus r = tw(.)(n+m).
Suppose finally that because of a distortion caused by rent extraction only
a share 0 < γ < 1 of the rent can be consumed, while (1 − γ) is wasted. The
policymaker’s utility in case of re-election is
U = γr +R. (8)
On the other hand, if he does not care about re-election his utility is
U = γtw(.)(n+m). (9)
The IC is therefore
γr +R ≥ γtw(.)(n+m) (10)
which gives the following equilibrium rent:
r = tw(.)(n+m)−
R
γ
. (11)
Now we can exploit the aggregate budget constraint (3) in order to get the
highest gi compatible with the incentive constraint. We have thus
g∗i =
R4
γn
(
α
α+ 3β
)
(12)
and
g∗−i =
R4
γn
(
β
α+ 3β
)
(13)
By substituting (12) and (13) into (1) we obtain ̟:
̟i = w(n+m
∗
m)(1− t) +
(
R4
γn
)α+β (
ααββ
(α+ 3β)α+β
)
(14)
utility (14) concerns only 1/4 decisive voters, whereas the remaining (3/4) re-
ceive
ω−i = w(n+m
∗
m)(1− t) +
(
R4
γn
)α+β (
αββα
(α+ 3β)α+β
)
(15)
Expressions (14) and (15) close the model in a plurality system.
3.2 Proportional System: ρ ≤ ρ∗
As we state in Lemma 2, whithin a proportional electoral system two outcomes
are possible: when the share of immigrants entitled to transfers is sufficiently
low (ρ ≤ ρ∗), the policymaker uses transfers rather than public goods in order
to get re-election; when ρ > ρ∗, the opposite holds8 . We examine now the first
case. Suppose again that the government is re-elected in stage 5.
8When ρ = ρ∗ it is indifferent to compensate voters through public goods of transfers.
We assume that the policymaker uses public goods in a proportional system only when the
inequality is strict.
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3.2.1 Stage 4: rent appropriation
It is useful to remind that under proportional representation there are n/2
decisive voters. Since ρ ≤ ρ∗, we know from lemma 2 that the policymaker will
satisfy the decisive voters with transfers and he will not use public goods.
3.2.2 Stage 3: wage loss compensation
In stage 3 tax revenues are collected and the decisive voters are compensated
for the wage loss caused by immigration. In the proof of lemma 2 we show
that the policymaker compensates through transfers in this stage as well. As
a consequence, in equilibrium we have gi = g−i = 0. Now we move to stage 2,
where we show how the compensation for the wage loss is computed.
3.2.3 Stage 2: immigration
When deciding to what extent to open the economy to immigration, the pol-
icymaker has to compensate the wage loss suffered by n/2 voters because of
immigration. In other words, he must give the decisive voters a transfer
∆f =| w(.)′ | (1− t)∆m. (16)
The marginal revenue of opening the economy is given by the increase in the
tax base:
∆TB = t(w(.)′(n+m) + w(.))∆m.
To compute the marginal cost paid by the policymaker in order to compensate
the decisive voters, it is crucial to recall that not only n/2 voters, but also ρm
immigrants are entitled to transfers. Immigration is allowed until the marginal
increase in the tax base equals the marginal electoral cost of opening the econ-
omy:
t(w(.)′(n+m) + w(.))∆m =| w(.)′ | (1− t)∆m
(n
2
+ ρm
)
. (17)
Condition (17) defines implicitly the optimal immigration level m∗p1 in a pro-
portional electoral system with ρ ≤ ρ∗.
3.2.4 Stage 1: reservation utility
In the first stage of the game voters set their reservation utility ̟. We proceed
as in section 3.1.4.
The policymaker’s incentive-compatible rent is
r = tw(n+m∗p1)(n+m)−
R
γ
. (18)
Now we exploit again the government’s budget constraint (3) in order to get the
highest f compatible with the incentive constraint, substitute it into (1) and
obtain ̟. We have therefore
f∗ =
R
γ
(
2
n+ 2ρm∗p1
)
(19)
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and
̟i = w(n+m
∗
p1)(1− t) +
R
γ
(
2
n+ 2ρm∗p1
)
. (20)
Non-decisive voters do not receive transfers, and their utility is
ω−i = w(m
∗
p1)(1− t). (21)
3.3 Proportional System: ρ > ρ∗
When the share of immigrants entitled to transfers exceeds ρ∗, the policymaker is
better off by using gi in order to get re-election, therefore f = 0 (see Lemma 2).
This finding suggests that immigration puts under special pressure transfers-
based social welfare systems. As usual, we assume that the policymaker is
re-elected in stage 5, and we find the equilibrium by backwards induction.
3.3.1 Stage 4: rent appropriation
From Lemma 2 we know that in this situation the policymaker will reduce
transfers for
(
n
2 + ρm
)
individuals and will increase gi for n/2 decisive voters.
3.3.2 Stage 3: wage loss compensation
In stage 3 tax revenues are collected and the decisive voters are compensated
for the wage loss caused by immigration. Since we are in the case ρ > ρ∗, we
know that compensation occurs through gi (see the proof of lemma 2 in the
appendix). Given that in stages 3 and 4 the policymaker never uses transfers,
in equilibrium we have f = 0. Now we move to stage 2, where the optimal
immigration is determined.
3.3.3 Stage 2: immigration
In Stage 2 the policymaker finds the optimal immigration level taking into ac-
count the cost of compensating n/2 decisive voters with gi. The increase in gi
necessary in order to compensate the wage loss w(.)′(1− t)∆m is
∆gi =
| w(.)′ | (1− t)∆m
θ(α+ β)gα+β−1i
(22)
as in the previous sections, the policymaker allows immigration until the marginal
tax base increase equals the marginal compensation cost:
t(w(.)′(n+m) + w(.))∆m =
| w(.)′ | (1− t)∆m
θ(α+ β)gα+β−1i
(n
2
)
(23)
Condition (23) defines implicitly the optimal immigration level m∗p2 in a pro-
portional electoral system with ρ > ρ∗.
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3.3.4 Stage 1: reservation utility
The reservation utility ̟ is computed as in the previous section. The result is
g∗iP2 =
R2
γn
(
α
α+ β
)
(24)
g∗−iP2 =
R2
γn
(
β
α+ β
)
(25)
by substituting (24) and (25) into (1), we get the decisive voters’ equilibrium
utility:
̟i = w(n+m
∗
p2)(1− t) +
(
R2
γn
)α+β (
α
α+ β
)α(
β
α+ β
)β
. (26)
The utility of the remaining voters is
ω−i = w(n+m
∗
p2)(1− t) +
(
R2
γn
)α+β (
β
α+ β
)α(
α
α+ β
)β
. (27)
By comparing (26) and (27) to (14) and (15), it is immediate to verify that
the only difference with respect to a plurality system is the number of decisive
voters (n/2 instead of n/4).
4 Electoral systems with immigration
In this section we compare the results obtained under the different electoral
systems with respect to public goods, rents and immigration.
4.1 Immigration
Conditions (7), (17) and (23) define implicitly the optimal level of immigration,
given by m∗m, m
∗
p1, m
∗
p2 respectively. All the expressions state that the marginal
increase in the tax base must equal the marginal cost of compensating the
decisive voters, which is always lower under the plurality system. It is easy
to show that, as far as the the marginal tax base is decreasing in m, we have
m∗m > m
∗
p2 > m
∗
p1. This is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 (Electoral systems and openness to immigration): countries
adopting plurality electoral systems are more open to immigration than coun-
tries adopting proportional electoral systems.
Proof. See the appendix
In other words, under proportional representation the extra fiscal base pro-
duced by immigration leaks into transfers, which benefit not only the decisive
voters, but also the immigrants. From the policymaker’s point of view, transfers
to non-voting immigrants are wasted, because they are useless for re-election and
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do not go into rents. Therefore, we expect that proportional electoral systems
reduce openness to immigration, and that entitlement to transfers is restricted
for the immigrants. Alternatively, there could be an incentive to extend the
voting franchise.
4.2 Public goods and rents
First, we remark that in our simplified model it is not possible to state under
which electoral system voters are better off: since we do not know the equilib-
rium wage, it is impossible to compare the utilities under the different electoral
regimes. For the same reason, it is not possible to compare the utility gap
between decisive and non-decisive voters under the different electoral systems.
It is very important to observe that the amount of resources to be allocated
in public goods or transfers is the same (R
γ
) under both electoral systems, and
it corresponds to the resources available after the policymaker’s IC is satisfied.
This means that the tax base exceeding R
γ
goes into rents for the policymaker.
Since the tax base is larger in the plurality system we conclude that the
increase in immigration benefits the policymaker. This is the reason why in
our model the tax rate is exogenous: even though plurality systems tend to
produce lower taxation (Persson and Tabellini; 2000, 2003), for any tax rate a
policymaker can extract higher rents from immigration when the extra tax base
is not "wasted" in transfers to non-voting immigrants.
The latter effect explains intuitively why in our model the proportional sys-
tem generates less immigration: when the economy is open to immigration, R
γ
is distributed among natives and immigrants.
Summarizing, we confirm several results in the literature, namely: 1) plu-
rality systems convey locally provided public goods towards the decisive con-
stituencies and reduce transfers; 2) proportional systems reduce public goods
provision and increase transfers; 3) benefits from government spendingare more
evenly distributed under the proportional system, which makes it necessary to
capture half the voters; 4) rents for the policymaker are higher under the plu-
rality system.
On the other hand, we add some new results: 1) plurality systems reduce
barriers to immigration; 2) in proportional systems immigration may switch
public expenditures from transfers to public goods or a restriction of eligibility
criteria; 3) proportional systems may incentivize policymakers to extend voting
rights to immigrants.
The result stressed in point 2) arises because proportional electoral sys-
tems bias expenditures towards tranfers, which tend to flow automatically to
immigrants. As a consequence, the equilibrium of welfare systems should be
threatened by immigration especially in these countries, where we should ob-
serve larger pressures to reform. Point 3) recognizes that for a policymaker it
could be easier to extend voting rights to immigrants rather than trying to deny
them transfers.
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5 Empirical evidence
5.1 The data
Our sample includes 34 OECD countries -see Table 1 in the Appendix- over the
1996-2008 period. Our database includes inflows and outflows of immigrants
and several economic, social and institutional variables.
The institutional variables related to electoral systems come from the DPI
database of the World Bank (Keefer, 2006). Electoral systems are denoted by
the "plurality" dummy, which is 1 if representatives are elected with a winner-
takes-all/first-past-the-post rule. If "plurality" is zero, the electoral system is
proportional.
However, many countries adopt a mix of proportional and majoritarian rep-
resentation. For example, some seats may be allocated on a proportional basis
in oder to preserve representation.
We take this feature into account by exploiting the “housesystem” dummy
of the DPI database, which is coded 1 when the majority of seats is elected
under plurality rule. In such a case, we classify a country under the plurality
system9 .
Naturally, we control for the economic determinants of immigration flows.
Real per capita income (“gdp_per_head”) is the main variable driving immigra-
tion. Trade-to-GDP-ratio10 (“openness”) measures the openness of the economy
to international trade.11 Total government spending and total tax receipts as
a percentage of the GDP (“tot_exp”and “tot_tax” respectively) account for
possible welfare magnet effects, that could attract immigrants where it is easier
to get welfare benefits.
We also include dummies for EU membership (“EU”), and for the existence
of former colonial empires (“colonial_empires”).
Finally, following Persson and Tabellini (2003 and 2004) we control for other
variables likely to affect immigration flows through their impact on the govern-
ment outlay and on the individual revenues.
Specifically, we include in our regressions three variables measuring the de-
mographic composition of the destination country. They are the log of the total
population (“logpopt”), the percentage of population aged 20-64 (“pop2_popt”);
the percentage of population aged 65 or more (“pop3_popt”)12 .
Total population is relevant because it is a proxy of development: highly
populated countries are less developed, thus they attract less immigration. The
share of working age population is important because it is a measure of labour
supply. Population over 65 is important because immigration could sustain
retirement schemes and provide domestic care services.
9Australia, Italy, Hungary and Corea are included in the plurality systems. Greece, Ger-
many and Spain in the proportional systems.
10Trade is defined as exports plus imports.
11Trade openness could substitute immigration in perfect competition models via Stolper-
Samuelson effects, but it could be complementary in models based on agglomeration exter-
nalities.
12Source: OECD Online Statistics (2011).
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The issue is now to define a measure of openness to immigration, which
will be our dependent variable. According to standard procedures, we measure
openness in terms of per capita flows. The use of flows rather than stocks also
helps us to avoid the bias due to historical reasons, such as the presence of a
colonial empire.
With respect to the econometric specification, we estimate a simple cross-
country regression. We do not use panels because electoral systems are in prac-
tice constant over time, and finally their effect would be captured by the country
effects. In other words, the time dimension is not really useful in our case.
In addition, we remove short-term factors that affect immigration (like the
business cycle or crisis in developing countries) by using the average inflow in the
period under consideration. We are left with a small sample of 34 observations.
Of course, this restricts the generality of our conclusions, and we are aware that
our results are by no means definitive.
Nevertheless, our analysis is a first step to evaluate the effect of electoral sys-
tems on the openness to immigration, and it is based on the currently available
data.
Our measure of immigration openness is then the 1996-2008 per capita av-
erage inflow of immigrants (“inflows_pop”).13 We would like to use the sum
of per capita inflows and outflows (mimicking the standard measure of trade
openness), but, unfortunately, data on outflows are available only for a sub-
set of countries14 . In what follows, we perform a simple exercise: we use the
available outflows for estimating the missing outflows15 . Then, we construct a
second measure of openness based on the sum of inflows plus outflows per capita
(“migrationopenness”).
Table 2 shows the cross-sectional 1996-2008 average, the standard deviation,
the minima and maxima for each variable of our sample.
Table 3 displays the correlation matrix between our main variables of inter-
est. It shows the cross-country correlation for each variable-country pair. Data
are averaged over the full period for which observations are available .
The correlations are consistent with the theoretical predictions summarized
in proposition 3. In order to avoid multicollinearity, we remove “housesys”
,“tot_exp” and “openness” from our regressors.16
The lack of correlation among the dummies for political institutions and the
other regressors assures that our results will not be systematically biased.
5.2 Basic specification
We estimate an equation of the following form:
13Source: OECD Online Statistics (2011)
14Data on outflows are not available for Canada, Chile, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Poland,
Turkey, U.S.
15We estimate a regression of the outflows as a function of the inflows for the available
countries. Then, we use the estimated coefficients to obtain the outflows for the missing
countries.
16The “plurality” dummy is highly correlated with the “housesys” dummy. The other
variables are highly correlated with “tot_tax”, “pop3_popt”, and “logpopt”.
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mi = c+ ηzi + αxi + βsi + ui, (28)
where the dependent variable mi is given by our measures of immigration
openness in country i. Greek letters denote the vectors of unknown parameters
to be estimated.
Openness to immigration can be affected by the electoral system zi (the
"plurality" dummy), and by the socio-economic-institutional controls xi and si.
xi includes the variables related to public expenditure, taxation, GDP, trade
openness and population structure17 . si includes the variables indicating the
EU membership, the existence of former colonial empires and the legal system18 .
Finally, c denotes the regression constant and ui the usual unobserved error
term.
We want to know whether plurality electoral systems increase immigration
as predicted by proposition 3.
The null hypothesis corresponding to this question can be formulated as:
H0 : η = 0
Equation (28) can be estimated based on cross-sectional data using standard
OLS. The t-statistic in plurality is thus a test of the null hypothesis H0.
5.3 Results
The results of our estimations are summarized in Table 4, where the dependent
variable is the per capita migration inflow ("inflows_pop"). We report in col-
umn 1 the coefficients of the regression including all variables, and in column 4
the coefficients of a reduced specification using only the significant variables.
Consistently with prop. 3, in both cases the coefficient on "plurality" is
positive and significant at the 5% level.
The remaining significant variables are the GDP per capita and two de-
mographic indicators. The GDP enters the regression with the expected (and
highly significant) sign. Total population and the share of population aged over
65 show a negative sign. The negative effect of population is expected, since
high population proxies lower development.
On the other hand, the negative sign on pop-65 is more difficult to explain.
In principle a positive correlation is expected because immigration benefits the
older population by sustaining the welfare system and by providing domestic
care workers. Nevertheless, it is worth to point out that the contribution of
immigration to the pension system concerns only marginally the current older
generations, whose pensions have been determined in the past. In addition,
many OECD countries included in our analysis were reforming their welfare
state in the period under consideration (1996-2008).19
17The variables are tot_exp, tot_tax, gdp_per_head, openness, logpopt, pop2_popt, and
pop3_popt.
18EU, colonial_empires, and civil_legal_origin.
19This is the case of Belgium, Chile, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherland, Por-
tugal, Spain, Sweden, U.K.
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Countries that have increased the retirement age in order to assure the inter-
generational equilibrium are less dependent on immigration. In a related paper,
Coleman (2008) proposes a similar interpretation.
Finally, the variable concerning colonial empires shows a weakly significant
(10%) positive coefficient.
We repeat our empirical exercise by estimating eq. (28) using the sum of
inflows and estimated outflows per capita ("migrationopenness") as the depen-
dent variable. Results in Table 5 show that there is no significant difference with
the previous estimation.20 This is quite expected since the correlation between
"inflows_pop" and "migrationopenness" is .933 (see Table 3).
5.3.1 Robustness
As we have argued above, we acknowledge that our specification is necessarily
scarce because of the sample size.
However, we try to improve as far as possible our analysis by taking into
account other omitted variables that might be correlated both with electoral
systems and openness to immigration.
Bertocchi and Strozzi (2010, 2008) argue that laws determining citizenship21
can affect openness to immigration in the long run. For example, jus soli legisla-
tion may cause restrictive immigration policies because it makes naturalizations
easier.
This issue is addressed by including in our regressor a dummy variable for
the jus soli. The estimated coefficient for this dummy is negative and not
significant, and the overall results are unchanged22 .
In addition, it could be argued that ethnic and language fragmentation can
affect voting rules and favour proportional voting systems, which can ensure
better representation of minorities. Moreover, fragmentation increases public
spending in order to secure the consensus of different groups (Alesina and Spo-
laore, 2003).
As a consequence, we check whether including a proxy of fragmentation
alters our results.23 Again, we find that its coefficient is not significant, and
that the outcome of the regression is unaffected.
In small-sample empirical analyses results should be tested for the presence
of outliers. When one country per time is excluded, the p-value of the estimated
coefficient for "plurality" is always 5% significant. The other significant variables
are unaffected as well.
20Colonial_empires is only no longer significant compared to the previous case. All the
other variables keep the same sign as in the previous exercise and are significant.
21Rules governing citizenship acquisition can be traced basically to jus soli and jus sangui-
nis. In the first case, citizenship is attributed according to the birth place. In the second case,
the children conserve their parent’s citizenship.
22The estimates in this section are available upon request to the authors.
23We use an index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization. It measures the probability that two
randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic
group. Source: Alesina, Baquir and Easterly (1999).
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An additional issue concerns the period under consideration. The 1996-2008
period may not be representative, due for example to high political instability
in various regions -particularly in the Africa and in the Middle East- which
caused large migration outflows (Gubert and Nordman, 2010). For this reason,
we have added to our sample the OECD data for the 1987-1990 period24 . When
regression in Table 4 is re-estimated, our results are confirmed.
6 Conclusions
A well-known quote from Milton Friedman says "It is just obvious that you can’t
have free immigration and a welfare state". Our results suggest that immigra-
tion affects the composition of public spending especially when the electoral
redistribution is obtained through transfers, thus in proportional electoral sys-
tems. More specifically, when transfers are prevalent the tax base increase due
to immigration flows also to non-voting immigrants, and policymakers retain
lower rents. Consequently, the policymakers’ marginal benefit from immigra-
tion is lower under proportional representation, and equilibrium immigration
will be lower than in plurality systems.
When it is difficult to deny transfers to immigrants, mass immigration might
push governments to secure the decisive voters using public goods even in pro-
portional electoral systems or, alternatively, to extend the voting franchise.
However, restructuring government spending and extending voting rights
entails high political costs.
In order to secure re-election and their own rents, policymakers can simply
close the border to immigrants; alternatively, they could deny welfare benefits
to immigrants by establishing residence requirements or even by accepting a
considerable illegal immigration25 .
These outcomes are empirically testable, but data availability is quite lim-
ited. We tested our predictions on the per-capita immigration inflows in 34
OECD countries.
The limited size of our sample restricts the generality of our results, and
furhter research is needed in order to find stronger evidence of the possible link
between electoral systems and immigration. For the moment, our basic analysis
supports the possibility that plurality electoral systems favor international labor
mobility.
24Data have been averaged by merging the observations from 1987 to 2008.
25Note however that in the latter case increasing the tax base is more difficult because illegal
immigrants produce in infomal sectors.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 ): .
We want to prove that in a plurality system f = 0 in equilibrium.
STAGE 4:
The aim of the policymaker is reducing expenditure as much as possible in
order to retain rents, subject to the constraint of giving the decisive voters their
reservation utility.
To achieve this purpose, in stage 4 he can reduce public goods provision for
(3/4)n voters and compensate the remaining n/4 by increasing their own share
of local public goods gi. Thus, he reallocates expenditures for public goods
until gi and g−i give the decisive voters the same marginal utility. This implies
g−i =
β
α
gi.
The utility of a decisive voter becomes then
ωi = w(n+m)(1− t) + θg
α+β
i + f (29)
where θ ≡
(
β
α
)β
< 1.
Then, the policymaker checks whether there exists a reallocation of gi and
f that leaves the decisive voters’ utility constant and leaves some rent.
If transfers for an individual decrease by ∆f , this loss can be compensated
by an increase in gi. The required condition is
∆f = θ(α+ β)gα+β−1i ∆gi, (30)
which gives
∆gi =
∆f
θ(α+ β)gα+β−1i
(31)
The marginal reduction of f concerns (n2 + ρm) individuals. In the aggregate,
this gives a total marginal benefit ∆f(n2 + ρm). The marginal compensation
cost paid to the decisive voters is ∆f
θ(α+β)gα+β−1
i
(
n
4
)
.
The net benefit for the policymaker is then
Net Benefit = ∆f(
n
2
+ ρm)︸ ︷︷ ︸
expenditure reduction
−
n
4
(
∆f
θ(α+ β)gα+β−1i
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
compensation cost
> 0 (32)
From assumption (2) we know that (32) is always positive, thus we have a corner
solution.
Consider now the possibility of reducing gi and increasing f . In this case,
the policymaker saves ∆gi
n
4 and needs θ(α+β)g
α+β−1
i ∆gi(
n
2 + ρm) in order to
compensate the decisive voters. The net benefit from this operation is given by
n
4
− θ(α+ β)gα+β−1i (
n
2
+ ρm) < 0 (33)
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by rearranging (33) we obtain
n
4
(
1
θ(α+ β)gα+β−1i
)
< (
n
2
+ ρm),
and we are back to (32). This confirms that the policymaker will use public
goods to provide the decisive voters with their reservation utility.
STAGE 2:
In stage 2 we compute the compensation for the wage loss due to immigra-
tion. The individual wage loss is | w(.)′ | (1− t)∆m. If the policymaker uses f ,
the total compensation cost is | w(.)′ | (1− t)∆m(n2 + ρm). If the policymaker
uses gi, the total compensation cost is
|w(.)′|(1−t)∆m
θ(α+β)gα+β−1
i
(n4 ). Compensation through
gi dominates compensation through f if
n
4
(
1
θ(α+ β)gα+β−1i
)
< (
n
2
+ ρm), (34)
which reproduces again (32). We conclude that in equilibrium f = 0, and the
policymaker compensates the decisive voters with gi.
Proof of Lemma 2):
We want to prove that in a proportional system in equilibrium gi = g−i = 0
if ρ ≤ ρ∗.
STAGE 4:
Suppose the policymaker has to decide whether to reduce gi for n/2 voters
and compensate them with f.
The cost of compensating the loss of a decisive voter is∆f = θ(α+β)gα+β−1i ∆gi.
There are (n2 + ρm) individuals entitled to transfers, and in the aggregate the
marginal compensation cost will be θ(α+ β)gα+β−1i ∆gi(
n
2 + ρm). The policy-
maker reduces gi until the net marginal benefit is zero, thus until
∆gi
n
2
≥ θ(α+ β)gα+β−1i ∆gi(
n
2
+ ρm). (35)
Notice that without immigration (m = 0) assumption (2) assures that inequality
(35) is always true, and we reproduce the result that proportional electoral sys-
tem bias expenditure towards transfers. However, when immigration is allowed,
the former conclusion holds only when
ρ <
n
2m
(
1
θ(α+ β)gα+β−1i
− 1
)
≡ ρ∗
Therefore, in equilibrium, in stage 4 gi = 0 if ρ ≤ ρ
∗ and f = 0 if ρ > ρ∗.
STAGE 2:
When we consider the compensation for the wage loss due to immigration,
if the policymaker uses f the compensation cost is | w(.)′ | (1 − t)∆m(n2 +
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ρm). If the policymaker uses gi, the compensation cost is
|w(.)′|(1−t)∆m
θ(α+β)gα+β−1i
(n2 ).
Compensation through f dominates compensation through gi if
(
n
2
+ ρm) <
(
1
θ(α+ β)gα+β−1i
)
n
2
. (36)
By rearranging (36) we obtain
ρ <
n
2m
(
1
θ(α+ β)gα+β−1i
− 1
)
≡ ρ∗.
Summarizing, when ρ ≤ ρ∗ the policymaker compensates the decisive voters
with f . When ρ > ρ∗ the policymaker compensates the decisive voters with gi.
Proof of Prop. 1)
To prove proposition 1 we have simply to use the assumption that the
marginal tax base from immigration (t[w(.)′(n + m) + w(.)]) is positive and
decreasing. Conditions (7), (17) and (23) define the optimal immigration under
plurality and proportional electoral systems. In order to compare the immi-
gration level in equilibrium we have to know when the marginal tax base is
lower.
Consider first the comparison between the plurality system and the propor-
tional system with ρ ≤ ρ∗. The condition for having m∗m > m
∗
p1 is
| w(.)′ | (1− t)
θ(α+ β)gα+β−1i
(n
4
)
<| w(.)′ | (1− t)
(n
2
+ ρm
)
i.e.
n
4
< θ(α+ β)gα+β−1i
(n
2
+ ρm
)
. (37)
Under the assumption in eq. (2), condition (37) is always true.
When comparing immigration in the plurality system and in the proportional
system with ρ > ρ∗, it is immediate to verify that m∗m > m
∗
p2,:
| w(.)′ | (1− t)
θ(α+ β)gα+β−1i
(n
4
)
<
| w(.)′ | (1− t)
θ(α+ β)gα+β−1i
(n
2
)
.
Finally, it is possible to compare equilibrium immigration under the different
cases in the proportional electoral system: the condition for having m∗p2 > m
∗
p1
is
| w(.)′ | (1− t)
θ(α+ β)gα+β−1i
(n
2
)
<| w(.)′ | (1− t)
(n
2
+ ρm
)
by rearranging the previous expression we obtain
( n
2m
)( 1
θ(α+ β)gα+β−1i
− 1
)
< ρ,
i.e. ρ > ρ∗.
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TABLE 1 
 
country 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Canada 
Chile 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Japan 
Korea 
Luxembourg 
Mexico 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Turkey 
United Kingdom 
United States 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
TABLE 2 
 
 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
inflows_pop  34 0.006 0.005 0.000 0.027 
migrationopeness 34 0.010 0.008 0.000 0.043 
pop2_popt  34 0.602 0.027 0.524 0.642 
pop3_popt  34 0.139 0.035 0.054 0.189 
logpopt  34 16.497 1.421 13.011 19.497 
tot_exp  34 41.967 8.675 20.399 55.748 
tot_tax  34 25.646 6.604 15.921 47.781 
gdp_per_head  34 23828.910 9480.084 9749.616 54963.450 
openess  34 87.930 49.319 24.224 269.255 
eu  34 0.636 0.489 0.000 1.000 
plurality  34 0.485 0.508 0 1 
housesys  34 0.333 0.479 0 1 
colonial_empires  34 0.242 0.435 0 1 
civil_legal_origin 34 0.788 0.415 0 1 
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 TABLE 4: OLS Regression 
 
 
inflows_pop 
                                   (1)            (2)                        (3)           (4) 
 Coeff p-value   Coeff p-value  
pop2_popt 0.0151 0.539   --------------  
pop3_popt -0.0503 0.044 **  -0.0435 0.020 ** 
logpopt -0.0021 0.000 **  -0.0021 0.000 *** 
tot_tax -0.0001. 0.138   --------------  
gdp_per_head 4.38e-07 0.000 ***  3.88e-07 0.000 *** 
EU 0.0005 0.750   --------------  
Plurality 0.0029 0.045 **  0.0031 0.017 ** 
colonial_empires 0.0021 0.104 *  0.0023 0.101 * 
civil_legalorigin 0.0003 0.851   --------------  
Constant 0.0288 0.098 *  0.0346 0.000 *** 
   
 
   
 
obs. 34    34   
Adj R-squared 0.712    0.705   
Note: *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % level. 
 
 
TABLE 5: OLS Regression 
 
migration_openess 
                                  (1)              (2)                         (3)           (4) 
 Coeff p-value   Coeff p-value  
pop2_popt 0.0014 0.974   --------------  
pop3_popt -0.0799 0.084 *  -0.0644 0.026 ** 
logpopt -0.0026 0.008 ***  -0.0023 0.008 *** 
tot_tax -0.0002 0.189   --------------  
gdp_per_head 7.08e-07 0.000 ***  6.34e-07 0.000 *** 
EU 0.0012 0.693   --------------  
Plurality 0.0051 0.060 *  0.0049 0.029 ** 
colonial_empires 0.0019 0.513   --------------  
civil_legal_origin -0.0003 0.896   --------------  
Constant 0.0500 0.124   0.0388 0.008 *** 
   
 
   
 
obs. 34    34   
Adj R-squared 0.598    0.623   
Note: *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % level. 
 
 
